Why didn't China defy the previous invaders?

China's Foreign Policy: Fundamentals - Developments - Challenges

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION

1. BASICS
1.1 PRAGMATISM
1.2 SECURITY AND INDEPENDENCE
1.3 NATIONAL UNIT

2. DEVELOPMENTS
2.1 COMMUNISM ON MAOISM - THE 1950s
2.2 ALONE AGAINST ALL - THE SIXTIES
2.3 BACK IN WORLD POLICY - THE SEVENTIES
2.4 IN THE MIDDLE OF THE STRATEGIC TRIANGLE - THE Eighties

3. NEW CHALLENGES - THE NINETIES
3.1 THE DECELERATED COMMUNIST CAMP
3.2 THE REMAINING SUPERPOWER
3.3 THE NEW MILITARISM
3.4 THE NEW NATIONALISM

SUMMARY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

introduction

More than 1.2 billion inhabitants, making it the most populous country on earth and about a fifth of humanity, with almost ten million square kilometers the third largest state territory,1 the greatest boom in the history of the world economy2 - this is the People's Republic of China. Reason enough to give it a place among the great powers of the international system.

So is China on the way to becoming a big tiger in comparison to the small tiger states, whose size is primarily of an economic nature3 is, or will the Middle Kingdom become the giant dragon that also asserts itself militarily in the world? Possible, because on the other hand China also has one of the last communist regimes that tramples on human rights, the third largest army in the world, three million strong and armed with nuclear weapons4 and last but not least, unresolved border conflicts with almost all neighboring states. That is why the foreign policy of the gigantic empire has been vigilantly followed since the Taiwan crisis last year, when it showed its militant side. There are reasons for speculation about the future course in this key year for the global power of the 21st century5 Enough: On the one hand, China's long-time leader Deng Xiaoping, who pulled the strings behind the scenes in Beijing to the end, died on February 19 and his successor still does not seem to be finally settled Formerly British crown colony Hong Kong returned to the People's Republic, which will in all likelihood accelerate China's path to at least becoming a world economic power.

The central question should not be whether the Middle Kingdom will achieve world renown, because in my opinion a self-fulfilling prophecy is already at work here anyway,6 but in which way - cooperatively or confrontationally - this will happen.

From this point of view, the basics and specifics of Chinese foreign policy are to be examined in the first chapter, and the developments over time in the second. However, these will span the relatively short span since the middle of this century, as China has never been part of an international system in its 5000 year history. The Middle Kingdom had always isolated itself from the outside world until it was divided into spheres of influence by the imperialist powers in the middle of the last century. From then on, it was "an object, not a subject, of world history" for a hundred years. One can only speak of an independent foreign policy since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949.7

Forty years later, the world, from which China can no longer isolate itself, was surprised by the collapse of the Eastern bloc. Finally, the third part of the elaboration will be devoted to these new challenges, also for the foreign policy of the People's Republic.

1. Basics

1.1 Pragmatism

The most important feature of China's foreign policy is its pragmatism. Although the People's Republic still sees itself as a communist or Maoist power, which should actually be quite isolated in today's world-political landscape, it usually overcomes this through skilful maneuvering, without ideological concerns. The clearest example of this was the introduction of a market economy system by Deng Xiaoping, which was supposed to feed the socialist state. Deng's slogan "Getting rich is glorious" superseded the Maoist "Serving the People". Deng justified this in the early 1960s with his so-called pragmatic principle: It doesn't matter whether a cat is black or white as long as it only catches mice. In his most important reform work, to unleash the entrepreneurial and merchant spirit of the Chinese, which Mao had put in chains, he apparently had no real plan beforehand. According to the marching orders, one had to "feel for the stones when crossing the river."8

That this was already the case in Mao Tsetung's time is shown by the fact that Beijing's foreign policy since 1949 has often been accompanied by militant remarks, but has been essentially considered, sometimes cautious and never dogmatic. The Chinese leadership always coolly fixed its own interests and consistently pursued them.9 One could even argue that it is always guided by an “opportunistic policy of interests” which tries to get closer to the important goals with minimal concessions.10 The following sections address these goals.

1.2 Security and Independence

These needs result primarily from the negative experiences with the imperialist powers, which tore the Middle Kingdom, in which the imperial dynasties ruled for thousands of years, from its isolation, humiliated it through unequal treaties, ultimately causing its decline and thus leaving behind a trauma.

In the 19th century, the living conditions of predominantly peasant China worsened when the country increasingly came under the influence of Western European and later also Russian and Japanese imperialism.

The major European powers with whom China had lively trade relations at the beginning of the century primarily pursued economic interests. Britain was so ruthless in this that it did not even shy away from drug trafficking. When China resisted large-scale opium imports, the Empire declared war on it. The Europeans clearly won this so-called opium war of 1839-1842, shaking the imperial state and opening China completely to imperialism. The unequal peace treaty with England in 1842 was followed by similar ones with France, Russia, Germany and Japan. The empire now fell into one-sided political and economic dependence on the great powers, who had divided it into spheres of influence and expressed it in the form of war debts, customs and taxes.

From the middle of the 19th century, there were repeated mass unrest against the imperialists and imperial rule. The best known was the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, which failed but further weakened Beijing's power. After 1900 the opinion spread that China could only be saved through political-ideological and technical-material imitation of the West. The most important representative was Sun Yatsen with his philosophy of modernization, which combined traditional and Western ideas, but whose main goal was to regain the national sovereignty of China. His oath, founded in 1905, pursued anti-monarchist and republican goals. The days of the imperial dynasty, which since 1898 tried to introduce reforms to save its power, but only half-heartedly advanced it, were numbered. The revolution could no longer be stopped: in the course of 1911, 18 provinces fell away from Beijing, and Sun Yatsen elected provisional president in the same year. Sun Yatsen proclaimed the republic in 1912, the same year the last emperor Pu Yi abdicated. However, this only existed in name, since China actually disintegrated into many parts ruled by warlords and was not to come to rest for a long time.11

However, China also practiced the extreme form of independence, isolationism, of its own accord for most of its history. This ability to isolate itself from the rest of the world is important because China not only isolated itself in the millennia before the European invasion, but also experienced such a relapse in recent history during the Cultural Revolution. So the world should always reckon that the Middle Kingdom will be enough of itself in an emergency.12

1.3 National unity

The experiences of the times of imperialism, when the empire disintegrated, made territorial integrity and reunification with the lost parts next to modernization the most important goal of Chinese politics13. Due to the one China concept that emerged from this, domestic and foreign policy can hardly be separated, since Beijing, for example, has always regarded Tibet and Taiwan as parts of the empire to this day, which is why their support from abroad is always condemned as interference in internal affairs become. Although the behavior towards the alleged provinces can also be described as foreign policy, the following chapter mainly deals with relations with the superpowers. This is not only because China sees itself as such, but also because it played a key role in shaping the East-West conflict, which in turn ruled the world during the longest period of independent Chinese foreign policy.

2. Developments

The chronological conception of this chapter suits the fact that the phases of China's foreign policy behavior can be traced back to the four decades since the founding of the People's Republic on October 1, 1949 by Mao Tsetung14 before the last chapter is devoted to the new challenges since 1989/90.

2.1 Communism to Maoism - The 1950s

The foreign policy of the young People's Republic in the fifties was initially characterized by a friendly relationship with the USSR, the gradual abandonment of it until an open dispute, and an extremely tense relationship with the USA.

After the founding of the communist country, it turned to its powerful communist neighbor against the background of the East-West conflict. In February 1950, a friendship and assistance treaty was signed with the USSR, but this did not bind the fellow believers to one another for long. As early as 1958, differences between the two in questions of economic and social development became apparent. With "The Great Leap Forward", the People's Republic took its own path to building socialism. This aversion was due not least to the détente between Washington and Moscow, which sought a "peaceful coexistence" at the 1959 summit in Camp David. In the negotiations with the archenemy USA, which had concluded a defense treaty with Taiwan against China in 1954, the USSR had not taken Chinese interests into account, although it wanted to maintain its influence there. China resisted this, however, by breaking away ideologically, politically and economically. When it finally broke with its neighbors in 1960, the Middle Kingdom had regained its independence.15

2.2 Alone against everyone - the sixties

The 1960s were the decade of simultaneous conflict with both superpowers. In the meantime, China had withdrawn from the Soviet Union and fell back completely into isolation during the Cultural Revolution. At that time one could hardly speak of a foreign policy.

During this decade, the relationship with the two superpowers was in its most critical phase, as the People's Republic fought on practically all fronts, detached from any ties to the international system. This culminated in total self-isolation during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, a power and direction struggle between 1966-69, staged by Mao and accompanied by shrill propaganda tirades.16 When the USSR significantly increased its troops on the border with China in 1966/67, and signaled that it would use them if the neighbors continued to adhere to their anti-Soviet policy, fear of the Soviet threat became the determining element. When a military escalation in the bloody clashes with the Soviets on the Ussuri in March 1969 could just be avoided, Mao realized that a comprehensive course correction of Chinese foreign policy was necessary because it would not in the long run open confrontation with capitalist and socialist World could exist.17 The conviction that the USSR had meanwhile developed into the more threatening of the two superpowers, together with the "catastrophic inadequacy of Maoist economic and social policies" finally caused China to return to the world political stage.18

2.3 Back in world politics - the seventies

In this decade, China re-entered international relations in a first phase of opening up policy, turning to the former main enemy, the USA, and at the same time practicing "relentless anti-Sovietism".

This re-entry began with a radical change of course in foreign policy: China began to cooperate with the main enemy USA and the other western industrial nations including Japan.19 The first great success was the entry into the United Nations in the fall of 1971, while at the same time Taiwan was shown the door. The real turning point, however, was brought about by the visit of American President Richard Nixon in Beijing in February 1972. Despite the continued disagreement over Taiwan, it was agreed that there were common strategic interests vis-à-vis the hegemony efforts of third parties in the Asia-Pacific region. This agreement should become a stable basis for the bilateral relationship in the years to come.

Theoretically, this was backed up in retrospect by Mao's so-called three worlds theory, which dominated the Chinese worldview throughout the 1970s. Deng Xiaoping, himself a victim of the Cultural Revolution and not rehabilitated until October 1973, explained this strategic conception of the first phase of post-cultural revolutionary foreign policy in April 1974 at a UN conference. Thereafter, the world was made up of three different parts: The first world consisted of the two competing superpowers, of which the Soviet Union was viewed as the sure source of a new world war.20 The second world consisted of the smaller industrialized countries, which were patronized by the superpowers in a central position, but also plundered the rest of the so-called third world including China economically.The latter was still economically backward, but would, according to the Chinese view, due to them The size of the population and the abundance of raw materials will achieve greater recognition in the world community in the future. In the fight against the rule of the superpowers, the third world states should seek a tactical alliance with the second world, so win them as accomplices.21 What is interesting is the classification according to the criteria of military and economic development, and no longer according to ideological standpoints. From this theory and the assessment of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic derived the necessity of an all world unifying alliance vis-à-vis the USSR.22 When Mao died on September 5, 1976 and shortly afterwards his closest followers, the so-called Gang of Four, were arrested, the People's Republic had once again become a recognized member of the international community.23

But Deng Xiaoping, who in the meantime was again sidelined by Mao because of planned market economy reforms and rehabilitated for the second time in 1977, stopped after he came to power in 197824 adheres to the condemnation of the USSR, which in November 1977 was explicitly described as the "more vicious, adventurous and sophisticated superpower" and "the most dangerous source of a world war".25

Paradoxically, this anti-Soviet orientation later served mainly to get into conversation with the Soviets again. China had thereby secured confidence in the West and played this card against all sides in its favor. When the main goal of establishing diplomatic relations with the USA at the beginning of 1979 was achieved, the latter broke off official relations with Taiwan in the same year and terminated the 1954 Defense Treaty.26 Along with the peace treaty signed with Japan in August 197827 steps were taken again towards national unity and security.

The willingness to talk to the USSR should lead in the same direction. In February 1979, China undertook a military action against the Vietnamese invaders in Cambodia, who were supported by the USSR, and in April terminated the friendship and assistance treaty with the superpower, which had been in existence since 1950, but it came about in autumn of the same year first Soviet-Chinese consultations. These were interrupted towards the end of the year because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but only temporarily.28

2.4 In the middle of the strategic triangle - the eighties

This decade characterizes the resumption of relations with the USSR after relations with the USA had become somewhat more stable. Ever since China reappeared on the world political stage in the early 1970s, there was talk of a strategic triangle between Washington, Moscow and Beijing.29 The missing, or at least too short, thighs were to be replaced in the next ten years by the improved relations with the Soviet Union, so that Beijing finally found itself in the middle of this triangle for the first time.

When the Soviet-Chinese consultations resumed in 1982, China imposed conditions to completely normalize relations with the USSR. In his pursuit of security, which includes the prevention of regional hegemony by other states, three obstacles should be removed. First, the Soviet armed forces on the Chinese border should be reduced, second, the USSR should withdraw from Afghanistan, and third, end its support for the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Even after Gorbachev came to power in Moscow in March 1985, who gave China priority in its Asian policy, it would be a few years before normal political relations were restored. The dispute that had flared up in 1960 during Gorbachev's visit, who had to rely on all-round relaxation to secure his reform policy, was not formally settled in Beijing until May 1989, when the Chinese saw the three obstacles removed.30

More important than the relations with the USSR, however, were those with the USA, as this - against the background of the modernization of China - also established contacts with other western industrialized countries and important international bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank.31 Here, too, China had clearly pursued its own interests: in 1979, when full diplomatic relations were established and the "policy of reforms and opening" began, the party leader at the time, Hua Guofeng, declared that China was facing a "race for life and death on the nutritional issue ".32 To do this, the People's Republic took advantage of the strategic interest of the USA, which feared a renewed alliance with Beijing due to the normalized relations with Moscow. In the course of the decade there were frequent contacts between Washington and Beijing at the highest political and military level, despite the latent burden of the Taiwan question. Here the Americans found themselves in a dilemma between an interest in mainland China and an obligation to their old ally, island China.33 Washington had in the meantime recognized the one-China concept, but in January 1979 it passed the Taiwan Relations Act, in which it could only envisage a peaceful solution to the problem, otherwise undertook to assist the island and declared its willingness to continue arms in the Republic of China , as Taiwan officially calls itself, to deliver. The criticism from Beijing was appeased not least by the granting of the most favored nation clause in trade with the USA, which has long been demanded and urgently needed for modernization.34 In a joint communiqué on Taiwan from August 1982, both sides had to swallow toads: Until the problem was solved, the USA should continue to be allowed to deliver weapons to national China, albeit on a steadily decreasing scale, but China - to this day - has not been able to renounce violence Wrest Taiwan.35 Relations improved significantly the following year, however, when Reagan removed China from the COCOM list, which restricts technology exports to communist countries. This not only gave the country the benefit of techniques that could be used by the military,36 but could also with regard to the second economic reform phase of 1984/8537 intensify trade with other western states. The US, however, imposed a renewed ban on the export of high-tech products when suspicions arose that China had been supplying Iran with weapons since 1987.38

Although China maintained constructive relations with both superpowers at this time, it has come very close to its goal of an independent foreign policy, for which it was no more able to be co-opted by overpowering allies than it was to free itself from rigid enemy images.39 The room for maneuver in foreign policy increased to the same extent as the structure of the East-West conflict that had determined world politics since its founding weakened more and more towards the end of the decade. This was very much in keeping with Chinese foreign policy, which was used primarily to create a conflict-free international environment in which the modernization of the country could flourish.40

3. New challenges - the nineties

Unless China falls apart because of its domestic political problems, such as the pressure of modernization, the growing need for independence in the provinces and the secessionist aspirations in Tibet, Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia41 Since 1989, after the collapse of the communist camp, its foreign policy has faced a number of challenges.

3.1 The collapsed communist camp

Since the USSR disbanded in December 1991, China has faced a profoundly changed situation on its northern borders. The Russian Federation, which is economically and socially desolate and threatened with further territorial decline, has taken the place of a superpower. In addition, five new states - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - have emerged. In addition to maintaining good relations with Russia, China must now devote itself to these new players. According to Beijing's ideas, a cordon sanitaire, i.e. a safety belt of well-disposed states in China, should be created from this. Together with the friendship treaty concluded with the Mongolian Republic in 1994, the People's Republic would have peace in its backyard, especially in view of the possible confrontation with Taiwan. The advantage here is that Russia, like the CIS countries of Central Asia, is very interested in good relations with China due to their poor economic situation.42 However, further disintegration of Russia would embarrass China. The People's Republic needs an actor capable of acting as a counterweight to the United States, also because of the desired multipolarity.

Initially, after the removal of the three obstacles in 1989, during Boris Yeltsin's tenure in office, relations with the neighboring state had developed to full satisfaction.43 This president, of no longer communist Russia, visited Beijing in December 1992 in order to further intensify the no longer ideologically founded relationship.44 The cooperation in the military, which was much criticized from abroad, sealed an agreement concluded in November 1993.45 But the strategic partnership that was only concluded last year is now on a shaky foundation again. The main reason is disappointment that trade between the two countries has not reached the expected level. Even the arms business is not going as planned, as the Russian defense industry does not want to breed a rival that could get in the way of its strategic and commercial interests. Another point of contention is still the common border. Although 98 percent of the process should have been resolved, a final solution is still being blocked by the Russians, who fear that they will be ripped off. All in all, Russia has nonetheless put its money on the Chinese map for the future, in the expectation that the People's Republic will become the regional supremacy.46

3.2 The remaining superpower

The collapse of the Eastern bloc is therefore less directly related to it

Successor states, rather than indirectly with a view to the remaining superpower USA, represent a challenge for China. This relationship was clouded by another event in 1989: the massacre on Tiananmen Square in Beijing. Demonstrators against inflation and corruption in particular had gathered there for several weeks until Deng rolled the tanks on June 4th and smothered the demonstration in blood.47 Despite the initial consternation, however, the sanctions imposed on China were soon relaxed again: in the summer of 1990, the most-favored nation treatment was extended by the USA, and in the autumn, together with Japan and the EC, they lifted the credit freezes again. Obviously, the voice of the People's Republic in the UN Security Council played a major role. When they abstained in November 1990 during the Gulf Crisis, and so Iraq could be condemned, the then US President Bush received the Chinese Foreign Minister again the next day. Contacts at the highest political level were resumed.48

However, the relationships were not without problems. For example, the delivery of American fighter-bombers to Taiwan in the fall of 1992 caused irritation, which Bush allowed for electoral reasons in support of domestic industry.49 They reached a low point when the President of Taiwan, Lee Tenghui, was granted entry to the USA in 1995 for a private visit. That as the "time bomb of the Far East"50 Taiwan caused further confrontations: in August of the same year, the People's Republic carried out missile tests off the coast of the former Formosa. The following year, the dispute escalated before the island's first independent presidential election when China launched a massive sea maneuver in the Taiwan Strait to influence the outcome of the elections there. The American government then sent an aircraft carrier formation to the region as a deterrent. After the elections, however, the show of force was soon over.51

There are several reasons for the recent confrontations. On the one hand, with the end of the East-West conflict, the basis of the strategic alliance that had united the two states against their common opponent Moscow since the early 1970s has been lost.52 On the other hand, for a long time neither side had a clear idea of ​​how their relationship should look in the future. The United States in particular was not yet clear about its role in the Asia-Pacific region. There are two different approaches to this question in the USA. One demands concentration on internal American problems and only the defense of vital interests in the region in question. Accordingly, China should be involved economically and militarily through a constructively critical policy. Others want to go in the opposite direction. The severely eroded American hegemony in the region is to be rebuilt, the one-China policy, which is viewed as a failure, is to be abandoned, and the growing Middle Kingdom is to be put in its place. On the one hand, China fears that the US could step up its engagement in the region, but on the other hand it is also interested in its permanent military presence. The Americans are supposed to withdraw from the Pacific region, which Beijing sees as its sphere of influence, in the long term, but not in the foreseeable future. The consequence of this would be that the states that fear for their security, such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and the ASEAN members, would trigger an arms race in which already existing tendencies to build up a nuclear umbrella would be strengthened. This destabilization could damage China's development in its difficult phase of economic and political transition. If the status quo continues, however, the People's Republic can expand its own capacities to such an extent that in a few years' time it will be able to control the region on its own.

On the other hand, the US has no interest in a confrontation, as this would cut access to a huge growth market. For this reason, Clinton decoupled the human rights issue from the most-favored nation clause in May 1994 and also lifted the high-tech sanctions imposed on China in October of the same year.53 Clinton's new policy towards China has only taken shape in the past few months: since the Taiwan crisis, the US has been trying to establish a new relationship with China, with the US government primarily thinking about economic goals. The new American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright speaks of a multifaceted approach in which human rights policy will probably no longer be at the top of the wish list.54

Incidentally, China is not yet ready for an open confrontation with the United States. The price of a military clash would be incalculable at the moment. For this reason, the Chinese leadership has to limit itself to "letting Washington feel the limits of its power in various cases of conflict."55 The time works for the Chinese anyway: while the military power grows, the willingness of the American public to take a military risk decreases as the risk increases.

However, the view of parts of the Chinese People's Liberation Army obviously speaks against the continuation of a policy of peaceful coexistence.56

3.3 The new militarism

The People's Liberation Army finds its place in this chapter because knowledge of its growing power, which is also one of the new challenges, is fundamental to understanding recent trends in Chinese foreign policy. Their strong position results mainly from two facts: on the one hand from their strong economic base, and on the other hand from their key political role in the suppression of the democracy movement and in the domestic power struggles in the succession of Deng Xiaoping.

The armed forces' unofficial budget is currently estimated to be at least four times the official defense budget.57 This was made possible by the fact that Deng wiped financial demands off the table at the beginning of the eighties with reference to the tradition of the People's Liberation Army, which had to support itself on the long march.58

The involuntary self-supporters seem to have turned into an officer enrichment army, which has built up a multi-billion dollar corporation with over 20,000 companies, from pig farms to brothels and hotels to airlines.59 Apart from the fact that these funds are mainly used to benefit the nuclear forces, the air force and the navy, "should enable the projection of power far beyond the coasts of the People's Republic", the army maintains relations via the military-industrial complex, for example with Russia and the Middle East, which occasionally give rise to the impression that "particular commercial interests 'pre-structure' foreign policy".

Jang Zemin, who, unlike Deng, can no longer derive any authority from shared experiences with the soldiers on the long march, is dependent on the army that saved the one-party dictatorship in 1989. This, in turn, is aware of its role as the last supporting pillar of the regime and has recently exerted influence particularly in foreign and security policy. For example, the tougher approach to Washington is the result of the army, the uncompromising attitude in the territorial conflicts in the South China Sea, the resistance to transparency in arms exports, and the increasingly nationalist course towards Japan. The military are also believed to have intimidated Taiwanese Jang Zemin in 1996.60

Is China about to take over power from the military?

The fact is that in the history of the People's Republic the People's Liberation Army has never distinguished itself as an independent political force that would have questioned the authority of the party.61 In addition, one cannot speak of a homogeneous political actor, since the army is strongly divided internally, not least because of the increased profit opportunities.62 And ultimately, the troops, almost half of which are no longer available due to their involvement in the company, need63 a peaceful environment for your business.

3.4 The new nationalism

Against the background of the Asianism debate, there is a new nationalism at work with the army's saber rattle. The name for the West has recently been: NDCs - newly decaying countries - the decaying countries of the West.64 Such shrill tones are the side effects of "a new and independent Asian consciousness (Asianism)",65 that is different from the hyper-individualistic West, which is "working on its decay",66 tried to delimit.

In the Chinese version, this means: "China can say no", the name of a bestseller. But the titles "Why China Can Say No", "How China Can Say No" and "China Can Still Say No" are also obviously selling well.67 In the case of the People's Republic, this tendency is not least due to the upheavals of 1989.Since communism has had its day, nationalism must now hold the empire together alongside the new idol of consumption. This is strongly influenced by emotions, acts as "new social cement",68 and is the "only cement that holds the People's Republic together and the party in power." "Since the Communist Party is no longer communist, it has to be all the more Chinese," and that means for foreign policy: Hong Kong 1997, Macao 1999 and then of course Taiwan.69

Résumé

Predictions are difficult, this has been known at least since the world was completely unprepared for the collapse of the Eastern bloc.

As far as the future of China is concerned, I believe that there are some indications that the country will grow into a big tiger, which due to its size will not be as tame as the small tiger states, but otherwise will be on a leash by the international community leaves. In pursuit of its pragmatism, China will also be prepared to have its independence curtailed by this involvement for the primary goal of modernization, provided that its national security is preserved. And it currently looks as if the multipolar world system that China is striving for, with China as its center of gravity in the Asia-Pacific region, will emerge.

Should the West, however, allow itself to be attracted to the tiger, it cannot be ruled out that it will become biting. This danger arises particularly if it "grows wings" as a result of reunification with Taiwan.70 To stay in the picture: If the tiger were given military fins due to the strategically favorable location of the island in relation to the China Sea, the potential dragon would be complete again ...

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[...]



1 Der Fischer Weltalmanach 1997, ed. v. Mario v. Baratta, Frankfurt a. M. 1996, p. 112.

2 Rüdiger Machetzki: The compulsion to grow, in: The heirs of the yellow emperor. China: world power in the 21st century. Partner or opponent ?, ed. v. Theo Sommer, Zeit-Punkt, No. 3/97, p. 32.

3 Recently, for example, cosmetic companies have been raving about a billion toothbrushes and two billion armpits when they think of the Chinese market, in: Theo Sommer: Asia - Partner or Adversary ?, in: After us the Asians? The Pacific Challenge, ed. v. Theo Sommer, Zeit-Punkt, No. 4/1995, p. 5.

4 Kay Möller: Who is in command of the rifles ?, in: Zeit-Punkt, No. 3/97, pp. 25 and 26.

5 Matthias Naß: China trumps, in: Zeit-Punkt, No. 3/97, p. 3.

6 "The prophecy of the event leads to the event of the prophecy." Such a self-fulfilling prophecy contains Watzlawick's much-cited example of the shortage and increase in price of a commodity because enough people believed this prediction, made hamster purchases and precisely because of this the commodity in question became scarce and expensive. Read up in: Paul Watzlawick: Instructions for Unglücklichsein, 3rd edition, Munich 1994, pp. 57-61.

7 Theo Sommer: China is enough for itself, in: Zeit-Punkt, No. 3/97, p. 47.

8 Kai Strittmatter: Liberator of China from Mao's chains, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, No. 43 of February 21, 1997, p. 8.

9 Gerhard Will: The foreign policy development of the People's Republic of China in the eighties, in: APuZ, No. 1/88 of 1.1.1988, p. 35

10 Joachim Glaubitz: China PR, foreign policy, in: Boeckh, Andreas (Hg.): International Relations, Vol. 6 of the Lexikons der Politik, Munich 1994, p. 81.

11 Information on political education: The People's Republic of China, No. 198, Bonn 1990, p. 3ff.

12 Sommer: China is enough for itself, op. Cit., P. 46.

13 Glaubitz, op. Cit., P. 81ff.

14 Ulrich Menzel: China Vr, in: Lexicon Third World, ed. v. Dieter Nohlen, 9th completely revised. and strongly exp. Ed., Hamburg 1996, p. 139.

15 Glaubitz, op. Cit., P.77.

16 Glaubitz, op. Cit., P.77.

17 Will, op. Cit., P. 35.

18 Glaubitz, loc. Cit., P. 78.

19 Glaubitz, op. Cit., P. 78.

20 Will, op. Cit., P. 35.

21 ibid., p. 36.

22 Glaubitz, loc. Cit., P. 78.

23 Will, op. Cit., P. 35.

24 Strittmatter, loc. Cit., P. 8.

25 Will, op. Cit., P. 37.

26 Glaubitz, op. Cit., P. 78.

27 Will, op. Cit., P.36.

28 Glaubitz, op. Cit., P. 78.

29 Peter J. Opitz: Changes in a "strategic triangle". On the changed relationship between China and Russia and the USA, in: APuZ, No. 50/95 of December 8th. 1995, p. 3.

30 Glaubitz, op. Cit., P. 78.

31 ibid., p. 79.

32 Machetzki, op. Cit., P. 30.

33 Glaubitz, op. Cit., P. 80.

34 Will, op. Cit., P. 41.

35 ibid., p. 42.

36 Glaubitz, loc. Cit., P. 80.

37 Machetzki, op. Cit., P. 32.

38 Glaubitz, op. Cit., P. 80.

39 Will, op. Cit., P. 44.

40 ibid., p. 45.

41 Sommer: China is enough for itself, op. Cit., P. 46.

42 Opitz, op. Cit., P. 4.

43 ibid., p. 5.

44 Glaubitz, loc. Cit., P. 79.

45 Opitz, op. Cit., P. 6.

46 Gerald Segal: Flirt between rivals, in: Zeit-Punkt, No. 3/97, pp. 54 and 55.

47 Strittmatter, loc. Cit., 8.

48 Glaubitz, op. Cit., P. 81.

49 Glaubitz, op. Cit., P. 80.

50 Xuewu Gu: Taiwan: Time Bomb in the Far East, in: Foreign Policy, No. II / 96, p. 197.

51 Strittmatter, loc. Cit., P. 8.

52 Opitz, op. Cit., P. 8.

53 Opitz, op. Cit., P. 11.

54 Strittmatter, loc. Cit., P. 8.

55 Opitz, op. Cit., P. 10.

56 ibid.

57 Möller, loc. Cit., P. 26.

58 Gunter Schubert: How dangerous is the People's Liberation Army ?, in: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Auslandsinformationen, No. 1/96, pp. 10 and 11.

59 Der Spiegel: "China is awakening, the world is shaking", No. 9/1997, p. 166.

60 Möller, loc. Cit., P. 26.

61 Schubert, op. Cit., P.3.

62 ibid., p.4.

63 Möller, loc. Cit., P. 26.

64 Sommer: Asia - partner or adversary ?, op cit, p.8.

65 Gerd Langguth: Confucius was also a democrat, in: Rheinischer Merkur, No. 21 of May 23, 1997, p.8.

66 Kishore Mahbubani: The West is working on its decline, in: Zeit-Punkt, No. 4/1995, p. 16. Mahbubani is State Secretary in Singapore's Foreign Ministry and one of the champions of Asian values.

67 Theo Sommer: Diva in national intoxication, in: Zeit-Punkt, No. 3/97, p. 50.

68 Machetzki, op. Cit., P. 30.

69 Summer: Diva in national intoxication, in: Zeit-Punkt, No. 3/97, p. 49.

70 Xuewu Gu, op. Cit., P. 205.